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Causation in Death After Trauma With
Pre-Existing Cardiac Disease
S. R. Gerber*
A MAN WHO HAD BEEN UNDER treatment for a cardiac disease
over a period of several years was injured and was ad-
mitted to a hospital where he died several days later. The
medicolegal officer certified that the death resulted from the
injuries.
A man who was not known to have displayed any symptoms
of cardiac disease was injured and was admitted to a hospital
where he died a few hours later. The medicolegal officer cer-
tified that this death resulted from cardiac disease.
How did the medicolegal officers reach these decisions?
What evidence did they consider? Would a judge, jury or other
triers of the facts be likely to reach the same conclusions?
Cases such as these illustrate an area where the schism
between the medical and legal professions becomes most ap-
parent when they are confronted with the need to collaborate
in solving a medicolegal problem. Frequently the approach is
indicative of diverging viewpoints directed to independent medi-
cal and legal problems rather than comprehension of medical
and legal aspects of a single problem. Such an approach fails
to effect a solution mutually satisfactory to both professions.
For example, in the specific situations under discussion here
physicians and attorneys might express seemingly opposing
views of the cause and manner of death.
Adoption of commonly used words as synonyms for more
precise terminology accepted for use within a profession leads
to confusion when two or more professions employ the same
word with different connotations. Thus, cause of death implies
to the physician the etiology of the condition responsible for
the terminal morbid process. In this respect, the physician con-
siders the cause of death as the ultimate result of interaction
of several conditions rather than a single entity.
The physicians' view of this enigma was expressed in an
* M.D., LL.B.; Coroner of Cuyahoga County (Cleveland), Ohio.
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editorial on death certification published in the New England
Journal of Medicine: 1
Of course, beyond mid-life a person usually dies fractionally
anyway. One need look only at a complete autopsy report
to wonder . . . why this man continued to live, and not why
he died.
An editorial in the Journal of the American Medical Association
further illustrates the pathologists' and clinicians' perplexities
when they seek a single definitive answer to the question Why,
Oh Why, Did He Die? 2
Clinicians seem to prefer derangements of functions to
anatomic alterations as explanations for causes of death.
Their patient has been suffering from severe heart failure
or metastatic cancer for years, but yesterday he seemed
to be fine. Suddenly without apparent reason, the patient
collapses and dies. In such circumstances, the doctor wants
to know very understandably why he keeled over at that
particular moment. It is not much good trying to tell
him that even cancer and a failing heart must come to an
end sometime ...
Let us hope our continuous quest for new knowledge will
one day make it possible to provide exact answers to the
inevitable clinical question, "Why did he die?" . . .
The ultimate answer to his question may have to await solution
of the primordial question "What generates life?"
Fortunately, there is an intermediary agent which brings
pressure to bear upon the physician to reach a decision as to
the cause of death for purposes of official certification. The Na-
tional Office of Vital Statistics delineates the following instruc-
tions for proper certification of the cause of death in accordance
with international classification recommendations for selection
of the main causes of death:
A cause of death is the morbid condition or disease process,
abnormality, injury, or poisoning leading directly, or in-
directly, to death. A death often results from the combined
effect of two or more causes. These causes may be com-
pletely unrelated, arising independently of each other; or
they may be causally related to each other, that is, one cause
may lead to another which in turn leads to a third cause,
etc. The medical certification of the Standard Certificate of
1 Editorial: The Convenient Coronary, 262 New Eng. J. Med. 149, 150 (Jan.
21, 1960).
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Death (1956 revision) . . . is designed to elicit the opinion
of the certifying physician as to the relationship to each
other and to the death of the causes which he reports.3
A review of the Standard Certificate of Death in anticipa-
tion of the Eighth decennial revision revealed certain deficiencies
for optimal use of the official certification of medicolegal cases.
Accordingly, a Sub-committee on Medical Certification of Medi-
colegal Cases, after a comprehensive study of the peculiar re-
quirements recommended a separate certificate for these cases.
Such a form would afford the "opportunity of determining how
a certifier reached his decision as to the cause of death, whether
by inquest, autopsy, investigation, etc. Similarly, additional
items of information of value for statistical and legal purposes
could be obtained about the circumstances surrounding acci-
dents, suicides, and homicides." 4 Other advantages of the sep-
arate medicolegal death certificate include closer coordination
between vital statistics registration and medicolegal officers.
Items for accidents, suicides and homicides would not appear on
the certificate forms supplied to physicians not associated with
medicolegal offices if this proposal is adopted.
The medicolegal officer, by intimate association and ex-
perience with both the medical and legal implications of the
deaths under his jurisdiction, accords equal importance to the
medical and nonmedical evidence, i.e., to the pathology and to
the circumstances. He is charged with the duty to determine
3 Vital Statistics Instruction Manual, Part II Coding and Punching, Section
D, Cause-of-Death Coding for 1960, p. 13 (U. S. Government publication).
"The medical certification form may be considered as consisting of two
parts (I and II) which are designed for convenience as:
I. (a) Immediate cause
(due to)
(b) Intervening antecedent cause
(due to)
(c) Underlying antecedent cause
II. Other significant conditions contributing to the death but not re-
lated to the immediate cause of death.
In Part I is reported the immediate cause of death stated on line
(a), and also the antecedent conditions on lines (b) and (c) which
gave rise to the cause reported on line (a), the underlying cause
being stated lowest in the sequence of events. * * *
In Part II is entered any other significant condition which un-
favorably influenced the course of the morbid process, and thus
contributed to the fatal outcome, but which was not related to the
immediate cause of death."
4 Medical Certification of Medicolegal Cases: U. S. National Committee on
Vital and Health Statistics: see 10 Curr. Med. for Attorney, p. 27 (Septem-
ber, 1963).
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the cause, mode and manner of death for purposes of official
certification and fully realizes the ramifications of the uses of
death certificates. He correlates evidence elicited from exami-
nation of the body with the circumstances and associated evi-
dence without assuming that evidence from any one of these
sources is of such overwhelming significance as to nullify the
importance of evidence from any of the other sources. He can-
not ignore discrepancies but must find the solution which is
compatible with all of the relevant evidence. Evidence elicited
from the body will establish the anatomic cause of death in most
cases, but in relatively few of those in which injury has been
incurred will the examination of the body alone suffice to de-
termine how those injuries were incurred. Thus at the Cuyahoga
County (Cleveland, Ohio) Coroner's Office each year 0.2% to
0.4% of the cases admitted are ruled Violence of Undetermined
Origin, indicating that the anatomic cause of death was de-
termined from the examination of the body but that investigation
into the circumstances failed to demonstrate conclusively how
the fatal injuries were incurred.
What significance does medicolegal certification have in re-
lation to the legal concept of causation? Translation of cause of
death into legal terminology denotes causation in respect to
legal responsibility such as the extent of involvement of ex-
ternal influences. While attorneys acknowledge that somatic
death results from physiologic processes, their direct concern
focuses attention on the extent to which external factors
launched or aggravated these processes. Accustomed as they
are to the adversary system, some attorneys tend to present
medical etiology and legal responsibility as two opponents en-
gaged in conflict rather than two aspects of a single problem
inextricably bound together and collaborating to produce the
fatal result. From this viewpoint they want the medical expert
to express his evaluation of causal relationship of external in-
fluences and physiologic processes on a basis of degree of medi-
cal certainty. When the medical evidence is not sufficient to
establish clearly such absolute certainty the physician hesitates
to state explicitly the extent to which various factors contributed
to the fatal outcome. His hesitancy is due to a lack of scientific
measures applicable to these evaluations. Unfortunately, here
another source of misunderstanding arises from use of ordinary
words to convey specific meaning within a profession.
Sept., 1966
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Distinctions in connotations of such words as probably,
likely, liable, could, might, or possibly when used in testimony
in personal injury litigation were the subject of an exhaustive
survey presented by Harley J. McNeal in an article entitled The
Medical Expert Witness-Positive-Negative-Maybe.5  These
words are defined as to acceptance in legal usage and listed as
to admissibility in various states. A comprehensive survey of
the same subject by Richard M. Markus appeared in this Law
Review under the title: Semantics of Traumatic Causation.6
The Ohio courts have acknowledged the need for expert
opinion.7
However, the restriction that the medical expert must de-
fine his opinion concerning causal relationships in terms of
"medical certainty" fosters honest divergence of such defini-
tions. The Supreme Court of the United States expressed the
opinions that "the jury's power to draw inference (as to) ag-
gravation . . . (and) . . causation" cannot be impaired by
"lack of medical unanimity as to the respective likelihood of
the potential causes"; and further, that "the matter does not
turn on the use of a particular form of words by the physicians
in giving their testimony." 8
5 McNeal, Harley J., The Medical Expert Witness-Positive-Negative-
Maybe, 2 J. Forensic Sci. 135 (1957).
6 Markus, Richard M., Semantics of Traumatic Causation, 12 Clev.-Mar. L.
Rev. 233 (1963).
Those who earnestly seek to understand these obstacles to satisfactory
communications between members of the professions are urged to read these
articles and After All, Doctors Are Human by Leonard S. Powers in the
Personal Injury Annual-1963, p. 429 (Matthew Bender Co., N. Y.).
7 Shepherd v. Midland Mut. L. Ins. Co., 152 Ohio St. 6, 87 N. E. 2d 156
(1949) (Syllabus 2):
"Where an ultimate fact to be determined by the jury is one depending
upon the interpretation of certain scientific facts which are beyond the
experience, knowledge, or comprehension of the jury, a witness quali-
fied to speak as to the subject .matter involved may express an opinion
as to the probability or actuality of a fact pertinent to an issue in the
case, and the admission of such opinion in evidence does not constitute
an invasion or usurpation of the province or function of the jury, even
though such opinion is on the ultimate fact which the jury must de-
termine."
8 Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corp., 80 S. Ct. 173 (361 U. S. 107,
109, 1959): The jury's power to draw the inference that the aggravation of
the petitioner's tubercular condition, evident so shortly after the accident,
was in fact caused by that accident, was not impaired by the failure of any
medical witness to testify that it was in fact the cause. Neither can it be
impaired by the lack of medical unanimity as to the respective likelihood
of the potential causes of the aggravation, or by the fact that other poten-
tial causes of the aggravation existed and were not conclusively negated
(Continued on next page)
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The concept of the inviolable right of the jury to determine
the legal aspects of causation was implicit in rulings of courts in
Cuyahoga9 and Hamilton Counties10 relative to GC 2855-16
(ORC 313.19): Coroner's verdict the legally accepted cause of
death. However, the court has recognized that the medical cer-
tification of the death including the manner of death is ap-
propriately in the province of the coroner.1 '
If triers of the facts are to have the responsibility of de-
termining whether or not the evidence of legal responsibility is
compatible with the medical testimony it would be desirable to
provide some guides for evaluation and correlation of evidence
offered by medical experts and other witnesses.
It is not possible to state dogmatically that certain evi-
dence independently will establish proof of cause of death. The
relative responsibility of pre-existing cardiac disease and sub-
sequent injury must be assessed for each individual case by
equating the various factors intimately concerned. Neither law
nor medicine can be an exact science in which certain rules
operate inexorably and consistently to produce the same result
every time. Too many variables of the human mind and body
intervene. Since no two individuals are exactly alike, their
reactions cannot be predicted or interpreted with absolute re-
liability using merely knowledge of how others reacted in simi-
lar situations or circumstances. Thus, it must be understood
that this paper was never intended to provide a do-it-yourself
guide to permit either attorneys or physicians to independently
(Continued from preceding page)
by the proofs. The matter does not turn on the use of a particular form
of words by the physicians in giving their testimony. The members of the
jury, not the medical witnesses, were sworn to make a legal determination
of the question of causation. They were entitled to take all the circum-
stances, including the medical testimony into consideration. See, Small,
Gaffing at a Thing Called Cause: Medico-Legal Conflicts in the Concept of
Causation, 31 Tex. L. Rev. 630 (1953).
9 State ex rel. Dana v. Gerber, 79 Ohio App. 1, 70 N. E. 2d 111 (1946).
G. C. § 2855-16 as enacted is invalid and void because it deprives party of
fundamental rights and is violative of Ohio Const. Art. I, §§ 1 and 16 and
Ohio Const. Art. IV, § 1, also being contrary to due process clause of 14th
amendment to U. S. Constitution.
10 Roark v. Lyle, 68 Ohio L. Abs. 177, 116 N. E. 2d 817 (1952). G. C.
§ 2855-16 is unconstitutional and does not give the Court of Common Pleas
authority to review the findings of the coroner.
11 State ex rel. Stark v. Zipf, 172 Ohio St. 462, 178 N. E. 2d 249 (1961);
Carson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 156 Ohio St. 104, 100 N. E. 2d 197
(1951); State v. Woodards, 6 Ohio St. 2d 14, -- N. E. 2d _, reported in 39
Ohio Bar Rep. (decided March 30, 1966).
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render a decision on any specific case. Rather, the purpose is to
provide some insight into the complexity of the problems, some
of the factors to be considered and the need for attorneys and
physicians to recognize each other's problems, and to attempt
to understand and approach them with mutual confidence and
respect. Attorneys should not expect that any simple guide
would enable them to analyze and diagnose complicated medical
problems nor should physicians expect that simple statements
of legal principles would enable them to analyze and adjudicate
involved legal problems.
Thus, any attempt to outline standards which the person
without medical training and practical experience could use for
evaluation and correlation of evidence would tend to engender
misunderstanding and miscarriage of justice rather than to aid
the triers of facts in any specific case. Dr. Wilmer Smith warns
against over-reliance on standards. 12
Standards are merely an aid to the evaluation of disability.
This aid is usually most helpful before experience has ac-
cumulated. Standards never indicate that the disability,
even in an identical case, 'lies here'; they mean only that
the evaluation of the disability lies somewhere near. Re-
gardless of how many such standards one has, the true guide
to the evaluation of scheduled disability lies always in the
ratio between function present now and preinjury func-
tion. In this volume we have not been at pains to present
a large number of standard disabilities. It is our feeling
that too complete a list of these becomes imposing to an un-
warranted degree and is too apt to engender a slavish
servitude which is a poor substitute for medical knowledge
and clinical discernment. These latter, when guided by
proper principles, are really the sine qua non of disability
-evaluation.
A review of the types of evidence routinely considered by
the medicolegal officer who has the statutory duty to officially
certify the cause, mode and manner of death may provide an
insight into the evaluation and correlation of the variety of in-
formation.
In cases in which death follows injury incurred by some-
one with pre-existing cardiac disease the fundamental question
to be resolved is the relative severity of the injury and the
disease as threats to the life of that specific individual. Although
12 Smith, Wilmer Cauthorn, Principles of Disability Evaluation, 167-8 (J. B.
Lippincott Co., 1959 ed.).
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examination of the body may afford evidence of the extent
of pathologic changes induced by disease and injury, in some
cases their comparable roles in the fatal outcome must be based
on the individual's medical history which reflects how his body
reacted and how he responded to treatment. Thus, the pre-
mortem signs and symptoms and the postmortem evidence of
disease and injury are correlated and evaluated.
In the cases cited at the beginning of this paper it might be
presumed that the first man displayed no symptoms of aggrava-
tion of the cardiac disease while he was hospitalized following
the injuries and that the injuries were sufficiently severe to have
caused death in another person of similar age whose heart was
normal. By contrast, the second man might have displayed
acute symptoms of cardiac disease during hospitalization and
terminally, while the injuries incurred were such that they nor-
mally would present no serious threat to life. In either of these
cases the autopsy findings might have affirmed the clinical
diagnosis or vice versa, providing agreement between the post-
mortem and premortem evidence.
When there is considerable disparity between the severity
of the disease and injury the conclusion is reached readily
and can be explained usually to the satisfaction of all interested
persons. Analyses of cases in which the extent of disease and
severity of injury approach equal status as threats to life require
more specialized knowledge to ascertain the distinction; there-
fore the rulings are more difficult to explain and afford more
opportunity for disputes. Honest differences of opinions sin-
cerely held arise from conflicting viewpoints and major interests.
How then can the triers of facts discern the truth?
Here, it must be recognized, is another divergence in focus
of the medical and legal viewpoints and goals. While the physician
seeks scientific proof to lead to the ultimate truth, the attorney
aims his efforts at the immediate goal of establishing liability
to settle a dispute. The dead cannot be revived for evaluations
by repetitive tests introducing variables according to accepted
methods of scientific proof. Therefore, physicians and attorneys
must rely on data to demonstrate the validity of their premises.
Statistical data can be found to support arguments both
for and against the major premises concerning evaluation of the
roles of cardiac disease and injury in causing death; i.e., whether
injury activated or aggravated pre-existing cardiac disease, or
Sept., 1966
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contrariwise, pre-existing cardiac disease adversely affected
capability for combating the injury. The triers of facts ought
to be indoctrinated in the critical approach to analysis of
statistics, the methods of use and their applicability to the sit-
uation under consideration.
Statistics are compilations of specific aspects of similar cases
and conditions. It must be recognized that such cases or con-
ditions also had dissimilar aspects. Thus, although statistics may
furnish valuable indices of influences, trends and factors, they
do not afford an inflexible medium for diagnosis of an individual
case. All influences must be evaluated from the viewpoint of
their effect on the specific individual, not what effect they might
be expected to exert on others in similar circumstances. It is
this aspect of the art of medicine that makes it seem highly im-
probable that automation alone will provide entirely successful
and satisfactory diagnoses. In order to utilize computers the
human mind must participate in the evaluation of the relative
significance of the information desired and set in motion the
programming. The appended outline indicates some factors that
might be fed into a computer to effect an evaluation of the ex-
tent of responsibility of pre-existing disease and subsequent in-
jury in causing death.
Having listed these factors to be considered there must be a
choice as to whether it is the medical interest or the legal in-
terest which is to be served before the machine can provide the
data. Neither physicians, nor attorneys, nor theologians can
ultimately resolve the question "Why did he die?" to the satis-
faction of everyone. Each profession should acknowledge that
theirs is not the finite resolution of the question of causation
but only the answer to the problem oriented to their specific
interest. It has been recommended that both physicians and
attorneys ought to avoid using the term cause of death and re-
strict themselves to the terminology more explicitly expressing
their respective viewpoints: medical etiology or legal responsi-
bility. This is consistent with Dean Prosser's view: 13
To deal with the problem in terms of causation, or to talk
of "proximateness," is merely to obscure the issue.
Physicians in general are not aware of the fact that the per-
son who induces injury to another by a criminal or negligent
13 Prosser, Law of Torts, ch. 9, § 48, p. 258 (2d ed., 1955).
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act is not excused from responsibility in the eyes of the law
for the outcome that may have been affected adversely by pre-
existing conditions. He must take existing circumstances as he
finds them. 14
It must be concluded that there can be no short cut to the
goal of correlating medical etiology and legal responsibility.
However, the pathways of interdisciplinary approach will be
made smoother, broader and more pleasant if physicians and at-
torneys recognize and respect the basic reasons for their di-
vergent viewpoints.
APPENDIX.
Evaluation and correlation of medical etiology and legal
responsibility-Fundamental factors to be considered when death
follows injury to a person who had pre-existing cardiac disease.
I. Pre-existing Cardiac Disease.
A. Anatomic Evidence demonstrates existence:
(Presence and degree as a factor in causing death de-
termined by following means listed in order of generally
diminishing specificity or reliability although exceptional
circumstances may alter these qualities.)
1. Autopsy + recent clinical findings and medical history.
2. Autopsy + medical history without recent clinical
evaluation employing diagnostic aids.
3. Autopsy + anamnestic history derived from nonmedi-
cal observers.
4. Autopsy alone.
a. Comprehensive, including gross and microscopic
examination of brain and all major organs.
b. Limited to gross examination of brain and major
organs.
c. Restricted to examination of heart.
Note: Extent of autopsy examination significant in
evaluation of autopsy findings with or without
medical history.
14 Id., p. 260.
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B. Anamnestic history as evidence of existence:
1. Medical history with recent clinical findings.
a. Extensive diagnostic aids employed.
b. Limited use of diagnostic aids.
2. Recent medical history with remote clinical "work
up" (a & b as above).
3. Recent medical history, no diagnostic aids.
4. Remote medical history, no diagnostic aids.
5. History derived from nonmedical observers (may be
more significant than 3 or 4 above).
C. Lack of evidence does not always exclude possibility which
may be inferred from negative findings of previous sources
of evidence with same order of relative significance sum-
marized as follows from probable exclusion to possibility
of inclusion:
1. No anatomic evidence, no clinical evidence, no history
of symptoms.
2. No anatomic evidence, no clinical evidence, some his-
tory of symptoms (reliability dependent on experience
and knowledge of reporter and opportunity to ob-
serve).
3. No anatomic evidence, remote clinical evidence and
history.
4. No anatomic evidence, recent clinical evidence and
history.
5. Minimal anatomic evidence, recent clinical history.
II. Injury-Factors considered in evaluating contribution to
cause of death.
A. Anatomic evidence-Extent, site and type of injury.
1. Premortem and postmortem evaluation by medical
records and autopsy examinations.
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